Essentialism is one of the most pervasive problems in mental health research. Many psychiatrists still hold the view that their nosologies will enable them, sooner or later, to carve nature at its joints and to identify and chart the essence of mental disorders. Moreover, according to recent research in social psychology, some laypeople tend to think along similar essentialist lines. The main aim of this article is to highlight a number of processes that possibly explain the persistent presence and popularity (...) of essentialist conceptions of mental disorders. One such process is the general tendency of laypeople to essentialize conceptual structures, including biological, social, and psychiatric categories. Another process involves the allure of biological psychiatry. Advocating a categorical and biological approach, this strand of psychiatry probably reinforced the already existing lay essentialism about mental disorders. As such, the question regarding why we essentialize mental disorders is a salient example of how cultural trends zero in on natural tendencies, and vice versa, and how both can boost each other. (shrink)

Maladapting Minds discusses a number of reasons why philosophers of psychiatry should take an interest in evolutionary explanations of mental disorders and, more generally, in evolutionary thinking. First of all, there is the nascent field of evolutionary psychiatry. Unlike other psychiatrists, evolutionary psychiatrists engage with ultimate, rather than proximate, questions about mental illnesses. Being a young and youthful new discipline, evolutionary psychiatry allows for a nice case study in the philosophy of science. Secondly, philosophers of psychiatry have engaged with evolutionary (...) theory because evolutionary considerations are often said to play a role in defining the concept of mental disorder. The basic question here is: Can the concept of mental disorder be given an objective definition, or is it rather a normative concept? Thirdly and finally, evolutionary thinking in psychiatry has often been a source of inspiration for a philosophical view on human nature. Thus evolutionary psychiatrists have suggested, for example, that man's vulnerability to mental disorders may well be one of the defining features of our species. -/- Written by leading authors in philosophy, psychiatry, biology and psychology, this volume illustrates that many debates in contemporary philosophy of psychiatry are profoundly influenced by evolutionary approaches to mental disorders. Conversely, it also reveals how philosophers can help contribute to the burgeoning field of evolutionary psychiatry. It is important reading for a wide range of readers interested in mental health care and philosophy. (shrink)

Evolutionary psychiatrists invariably consider schizophrenia to be a paradox: how come natural selection has not yet eliminated the infamous ‘genes for schizophrenia’ if the disorder simply crushes the reproductive success of its carriers, if it has been around for thousands of years already, and if it has a uniform prevalence throughout the world? Usually, the answer is that the schizophrenic genotype is subject to some kind of balancing selection: the benefits it confers would then outbalance the obvious damage it does. (...) In this paper, however, I will show that the assumptions underlying such evolutionary accounts of schizophrenia are at least implausible, and sometimes even erroneous. First of all, I will examine some factual assumptions, in particular about schizophrenia’s impact on reproductive success, its genetics, its history, and its epidemiology. Secondly, I will take a critical look at a major philosophical assumption in evolutionary psychiatric explanations of schizophrenia. Indeed, evolutionary psychiatrists take it for granted that schizophrenia is a natural kind, i.e. a bounded and objectively real entity with discrete biological causes. My refutation of this natural kind view suggests that schizophrenia is in fact a reified umbrella concept, covering a heterogeneous group of disorders. Therefore, schizophrenia, as we now know it, simply doesn’t have an evolutionary history. (shrink)

Abstractabstract:Most of Charles Darwin's ideas have withstood the test of time, but some of them turned out to be dead ends. This article focuses on one such dead end: Darwin's ideas about the connection between piloerection and mental illness. Piloerection is a medical umbrella term to refer to a number of phenomena in which our hair tends to stand on end. Darwin was one of the first scientists to study it systematically. In The Expression of the Emotions in Man and (...) Animals (1872), he discusses piloerection in the context of his analysis of the expressions involved in fear and anger, relying heavily on the evidence provided by one of his correspondents, the British psychiatrist James Crichton Browne. This essay reveals how Darwin's initial doubts about the similarity between piloerection in animals and psychiatric patients were eased when studying photographic portraits of female psychiatric patients sent to him by Crichton Browne. It considers arguments against Darwin's reading of these portraits and the apparent contrast between this reading and his own skepticism, in later years, about the value of documentary photography. The article concludes with some notes regarding the reception of Darwin's ideas about psychopathology. (shrink)

When it comes to humans, ‘homosexuality’ refers to a variety of characteristics, ranging from sexual behaviours, desires, preferences, and orientations, to sexual identities. The question driving this paper is whether, and to what extent, it is justified to also ascribe such characteristics to nonhuman animals. Scientific opinions are divided on this issue, ranging from militantly positive to cautiously positive to markedly negative, with many in between suggesting we should at least change the vocabulary.

When it comes to humans, ‘homosexuality’ refers to a variety of characteristics, ranging from sexual behaviours, desires, preferences, and orientations, to sexual identities. The question driving this paper is whether, and to what extent, it is justified to also ascribe such characteristics to nonhuman animals. Scientific opinions are divided on this issue, ranging from militantly positive to cautiously positive to markedly negative, with many in between suggesting we should at least change the vocabulary.

Questions about the naturalness or unnaturalness of homosexuality are as old as the hills, and the answers have often been used to condemn homosexuals, their behaviors, and their relationships. In the past two centuries, a number of sciences have involved themselves in this debate, introducing new vocabularies, theories, arguments, and data, many of which have gradually helped tip the balance toward tolerance and even acceptance. In this book, philosophers Pieter R. Adriaens and Andreas De Block explore the history and philosophy (...) of the gay sciences, revealing how individual and societal values have colored how we think about homosexuality. The authors unpack the entanglement of facts and values in studies of male homosexuality across the natural and human sciences and consider the extent to which science has mitigated or reinforced homonegative mores. The focus of the book is on homosexuality's assumed naturalness. Geneticists rephrased naturalness as innateness, claiming that homosexuality is innate-colloquially, that homosexuals are born gay. Zoologists thought it a natural affair, documenting its existence in myriad animal species, from maybugs to men. Evolutionists presented homosexuality as the product of natural selection and speculated about its adaptive value. Finally, psychiatrists, who had initially pathologized homosexuality, eventually appealed to its naturalness or innateness to normalize it. Discussing findings from an array of sciences--comparative zoology, psychiatry, anthropology, evolutionary biology, social psychology, developmental biology, and machine learning--this book is essential reading for anyone interested in what science has to say about homosexuality. (shrink)

De invloed van het denken van Paul Moyaert is zeer groot. Daarom wil 'Orde scheppen' hulde brengen aan deze filosoof en zijn intellectuele bezetenheid. De thematische diversiteit van het boek weerspiegelt de biodiversiteit van Moyaerts eigen werk, die met enig geweld tot drie grote thema's of domeinen kan worden herleid: wijsgerige antropologie, psychopathologie en religie. Onderwerpen zijn: het symbolische, de liefde, uchronie, de echtheid van beelden, en poëzie; de afstemming bij jongvolwassenen met een meervoudige handicap, homoseksualiteit bij vrouwelijke adolescenten, en (...) Kant en Foucault; en ten slotte de hardnekkigheid van religie, christelijke ascese, de vele gezichten van Kierkegaard, Franciscus van Assisi, en de oorlogsdagboeken van Hans Keilson. (shrink)